El 19 de Julio 2022, Baltasar Garzón presentó al Comité de DDHH de la ONU un escrito instando a que el gobierno español cumpla con la obligación de otorgarle la 'reparación integral' indicada por el Comité en su dictamen de agosto de 2021. El plazo para implementarlo venció en abril.
Un comunicado con más información en español aqui. El escrito presentado ayer esta aqui.
On 19 July 2022, we made submissions on behalf of Baltasar Garzon to the Special Rapporteur on Follow-up of the UN Human Rights Committee, expressing deep concern about Spain’s failure to implement the Committee’s ground-breaking Garzon v Spain decision. The decision of August 2021 reached damning conclusions that Spain had violated a series of the former judge’s rights and undermined judicial independence, through criminal processes that were inherently arbitrary, violated the right to a fair trial before an independent impartial tribunal and were based on a crime (‘prevaricación’ which criminalizes ‘unjust judgments’) which was unforeseeable and a violation of the principle of legality.
The submissions presented today make clear what is required to meet the ‘holistic reparation’ the Committee called for in this case, in line with international standards and the Committee’s own jurisprudence. Spain needs to grapple with the profound implications of the Committee’s findings, and ensure reinstatement, recognition and broader guarantees of non-repetition including legal and institutional reform. By contrast, its silence is an affront to the Committee’s authority and undermines human rights and rule of law in Spain.
The Special Rapporteur on Follow Up of the UNHRC, and other international mechanisms, are urged to actively engage with the Spanish government to ensure that this important decision is given effect without further delay. As the Government is not cooperating and has not taken concrete actions to implement the decision, we have requested a report on the State’s non-compliance.
On the international day in support of victims of torture, we received the important news that Poland has finally paid damages to our client, CIA torture victim and Guantanamo detainee Abu Zubaydah. Compensation has been slow - the sums paid were awarded by the European Court of Human Rights in its 2014 judgment. It has been a fraught process, littered with obstacles. Monetary relief is also plainly insufficient, and can only ever be part of the much fuller reparation due to victims such as Abu Zubaydah.
Nonetheless, this compensation by Poland - following a similar payment by Lithuania six months ago - is an important and symbolic step forward. It provides some recognition and reparation for the egregious torture and arbitrary detention of our client, for which many states share responsibility. We hope this step will catalyse fuller reparation, including recognition, apology and reckoning, by Poland and other states such as the US, UK and others, to ensure that lessons are learned. As a priority, states must also assume their responsibility for bringing his ongoing, cruel arbitrary detention at Guantanamo to an end, with suitable relocation, rehabilitation and support.
We are grateful to the many who helped to secure the payment of damages in this case, through multiple rounds of challenge and litigation, including our Polish counsel Bartek Janjowski and colleagues, and many others. Background on the cases are here. For more information contact helen@rightsinpractice.org.
La fecha límite (ampliada) para la implementación de la decisión condenatoria del Comité de Derechos Humanos de la ONU en el emblemático caso #Garzón c. Espana venció en Abril 2022. Todavía no tenemos respuesta a la demanda de nuestra cliente por una reparación integral….
En Agosto 2021 el Comité decidió que los procesos contra el juez por sus decisiones judiciales fueron arbitrarias, carecieron de imparcialidad, y constituyeron una interferencia con la independencia judicial. Mas información sobre el caso esta aquí.
Helen Duffy radio interview with BBC World Service News Hour on genocide and international justice in Ukraine
Submissions were lodged on behalf of torture victim and Guantanamo prisoner Mr. Abu Zubaydah on Friday 21 January before the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers charged with overseeing the implementation of the historic Abu Zubaydah v Poland and Abu Zubaydah v Lithuania judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. The ‘Rule 9’ submissions express deep concern regarding the state of implementation. They recognise recent progress, notably Lithuania’s recent payment of compensation to Mr. Abu Zubaydah’s beneficiaries. However, in both Poland and Lithuania there remains a striking failure to implement all other aspects of the judgment: there is no effective investigation or accountability, an ongoing failure to acknowledge the truth and provide reparations, and grossly insufficient measures to ensure that the flagrant denial of justice to which our client is currently subjected is brought to an end. As in our written and oral submissions to the September meeting of the Committee of Ministers, the submissions were presented jointly with legal representatives form Mr. Al Nashiri. The submissions underscore the importance of robust ongoing engagement in oversight of full implementation by the Committee of Ministers.
The decisions of the Committee of Ministers on Poland and Lithuania of March 2022 are here.
This short Year in Review note highlights some of the work of HRiP during 2021. Deep gratitude to the many who collaborated in diverse ways.
On 11 January 2022, together with the representatives of Mr al Nashiri, we wrote an open letter to Mr. Constantinos Efstathiou, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) Rapporteur on the Implementation of Judgments of the ECtHR, in relation to the lack of effective implementation of the historic judgments in Mr Abu Zubaydah and Mr al Nashiri’s cases against Poland, Lithuania (Zubaydah) and Romania (al Nashiri).
While recognising progress (e.g. in late December 2021 Lithuania paid Abu Zubaydah the compensation ordered by the Court in 2018), it highlights the stark failure of all states to make full reparation. It underscores the outstanding lack of any recognition of wrongdoing or apology, ineffective investigation and truth-telling, the dearth of accountability and measures to ensure non-repetition, and the need for more effective collective representations to the US to end the ‘flagrant denial of justice’ at Guantanamo. On the contrary, the partial closure of the investigation in Poland in 2021 was part of a sad indication of the opposite trajectory, consolidating impunity. The letter calls for renewed efforts by the Committee of Ministers to press for meaningful reckoning with the past and learning lessons for the future, and rigorous engagement and oversight by PACE.
On 22 December 2021, Lithuania paid Mr Abu Zubaydah’s next of kin the compensation ordered by the ECtHR in its 2018 Abu Zubaydah v Lithuania judgment. The damages award against Poland remains pending. Compensation has symbolic and practical importance, and we welcome Lithuanian compliance with this aspect of reparation. Other aspects remain woefully neglected; these include the need to finally recognise responsibility and offer a public apology, to expose and confront the truth and learn lessons for the future, to ensure investigation and accountability. In particular, on the twentieth anniversary of the opening of Guantanamo, states should take all possible measures to ensure that the ongoing violation of our clients rights through his arbitrary detention at Guantanamo Bay is brought to an end.
JUST FILED: A brief on academic freedom has been filed at the European Court of Human Rights today in the “Academics for Peace” case (Kamuran AKIN v. Turkey and 42 other applications , Application nos. 72796/16, 72798/16, 72799/16 et al). The third party intervention was presented by Profs. Helen Duffy and Philip Leach (co-supervisors in the Turkey Litigation Support Project) on behalf of a group of leading academics, addressing the nature of academic freedom, its significance for human rights and democracy and its legal protection in international law.
The case emerges from a statement issued on 11 January 2016 by a group of academics from diverse Turkish universities, entitled “We will not be a party to this crime,” which critically questioned the Turkish Government’s role in the conflict in South-east Turkey and associated serious rights violations. The day after the “Academics for Peace Petition” was published, President Erdoğan described signatories as “so-called intellectuals” and “pseudo academics” and accused them of treason. This was followed by their public vilification as “terrorists,” and they were subject to disciplinary, administrative and criminal proceedings across the country. Following the subsequent July 2016 coup, hundreds of academics, including the applicants, were then dismissed from their university positions through a series of emergency decrees.
The brief filed today focuses first on the nature of ‘academic freedom,’ embracing individual and institutional autonomy from the state, and a public and social role for academia (informing healthy democratic discourse including criticism of government), both of which preclude requiring ‘loyalty’ to the state, as the Turkish authorities purport to do. The brief explains the significance of academic freedom for the array of human rights under the European Convention on Human Rights and broader international human rights law - for the academics directly affected, for a full range of rights of many others, and for the fundamental values underpinning the ECHR and democratic systems. The intervention calls for the Court’s considered attention to the issue of academic freedom which remains relatively underexplored in ECHR jurisprudence. It indicates the significant implications of the issue for the interpretation and application of the ECHR: informing states’ ‘positive obligations’ to create an ‘enabling environment’ for academic expression, and requiring a strict approach to permissible restrictions on rights, which must be a) provided for in clear foreseeable law, b) strictly necessary and proportionate, and c) subject to meaningful remedies and review. The legal framework, and procedural judicial deficits within Turkey, suggest that no element of this criteria is met. The brief also questions whether restrictions on academic freedom of the sort at issue in this case are related to the ‘emergency’ declared following the attempted coup in July 2016. It urges the Court to consider whether, instead, the clampdown in fact pursued an ‘ulterior purpose’, as academics are the latest in a line of societal actors to be targeted for their expression of opposition to the Turkish government.
The brief calls on the Court to robustly apply the ECHR and international standards to safeguard academic autonomy and freedom of expression on matters of public concern. The issue is timely and pressing in the context of alarming growth in attacks on academic freedom in Turkey and around the globe, and its insidious implications for closing democratic space.
The third party intervention filed on 20 12 2021 is here, the list of interveners here.
The hearing in the case of US v Abu Zubaydah begins today, 6 October, in the US Supreme Court. The Court will decide whether the US government can block torture victim Abu Zubaydah and foreign prosecutors from subpoenaing information in relation to the CIA torture programme, on state secrecy grounds. The case arose in the context of a Polish investigation into CIA secret detention on its soil which was ordered by the European Crt of Human Rights in the Abu Zubaydah v Poland case (2014). In this context, evidence was sought from psychologist CIA contractors (James E Mitchell and Bruce Jessen). However, despite the notoriety of the CIA led programme, and evidence having already been given in the public domain, the government claims a blanket and overreaching approach to secrecy and national security to shield information in relation to CIA torture and unlawful detention. At stake are the rights of victims and society, as well as the ability of foreign investigators to do their job unhindered by USG intervention, and the credibility of the US administration’s commitment to human rights and rule of law. A statement on the background to the case and the search for justice for Abu Zubaydah is here.
In a powerful decision dated 25 August 2021, the United Nations Human Rights Committee found Spain responsible for violating the rights of our client, former judge of the Spanish national court, Baltasar Garzón. The 18-person expert UN body was unanimous in finding that criminal proceedings against Garzón, based solely on his judicial interpretations, were ‘arbitrary’ and should never have been brought. It also found that the Spanish courts lacked impartiality in his case, the right to appeal was not respected, and the Spanish law under which he was prosecuted did not meet the requirements of legality and foreseeability in criminal law.
Between 2009 y 2012, Judge Garzón was investigated and prosecuted for ‘prevaricacion’ or criminal malfeasance for his judicial decisions in the Franquismo and Gürtel cases. He was first prosecuted for his decision to open an investigation into allegations of crimes against humanity during Franco’s dictatorship, despite a controversial amnesty law, but ultimately acquitted. By that time a second criminal case, for his decision to authorize telephone intercepts in the Gürtel high-level political corruption case, had led to conviction and removal from judicial office. The UNHRC makes clear that Garzón’s judicial decisions were indisputably reasoned, supported by other judges and the Ministerio Publico, and that they had been overturned on appeal (where any alleged error could be corrected). They could not constitute criminal activity, and the prosecution and convictions in this case were inherently arbitrary. The decision fully vindicates the applicant’s long-running complaint against the Spanish state for arbitrarily subjecting him to criminal prosecution for the exercise of his judicial role, in order to remove him from judicial office. It also reasserts the importance of safeguarding judicial independence, the violation of which is epitomised by this case.
Spain must now provide ‘full’ reparation, which includes restoring his judicial position, deleting his criminal record, providing compensation and ensuring that such an affront to judicial independence cannot happen again.
Helen Duffy, HRiP, had the honour of representing Baltasar Garzón before the UNHRC. The case was filed on 31 January 2016. Our press statement in English and Spanish are here.
The full decision of the UNHRC is available (in Spanish) here.
On 30 April 2021 a new petition and urgent action was filed on behalf of Abu Zubaydah against the United States and 6 other countries – UK, Thailand, Poland, Morocco, Lithuania, Afghanistan – before the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. It focuses on the prime responsibility of the US for detaining our client in legal limbo, without review of lawfulness, charge or trial, for 19 years. It calls for Abu Zubaydah’s release - an essential remedy after 19 years arbitrary detention. The application calls on all respondent states, that share responsibility for his torture and for contributing to his ongoing arbitrary detention, to share responsibility for taking all possible measures to bring it to an end. Release should be accompanied by medical and psychological support and rehabilitation, transparency, investigation, accountability and reparation by all states, which includes learning lessons from the worst of ‘war on terror’ crimes, which his case represents, and providing meaningful guarantees of non-repetition. This is the first time a case has been brought against some of these states for their now notorious and well documented roles in the global rendition and torture programme. The particular vulnerability of Abu Zubaydah and other Guantanamo detainees at this time is clear from reports of Covid vaccines being denied to detainees and hunger strikes spreading in Guantanamo, underscoring the urgency of this complaint. For background, press statement and the Complaint as filed, see here.
The Judicial Guidance on the implementation of the EU counter-terrorism directive consistently with human rights, written by Helen Duffy of HRiP and Rosin Pillay and Karolina Babicka of ICJ, is now available here in five languages.
Here are some recent blogposts by Helen Duffy on important litigation developments on cases and issues at the core of HRiP’s work.
On decisions of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child that France’s human rights obligations apply to French children in dire humanitarian need in camps in NE Syria: https://www.childrensrightsobservatory.nl/case-notes/casenote2021-3
On Georgia v Russia and the extremely restrictive approach to ‘extra-territoriality’ in the European Court of Human Rights: https://www.justsecurity.org/74465/georgia-v-russia-jurisdiction-chaos-and-conflict-at-the-european-court-of-human-rights/
On Climate Justice litigation before the Norwegian Supreme Court: https://www.ejiltalk.org/people-v-arctic-oil-before-supreme-court-of-norway-whats-at-stake-for-human-rights-protection-in-the-climate-crisis/
On judicial independence and the Garzon v Spain case at the United Nations Human Rights Committee: http://opiniojuris.org/2020/10/22/the-garzon-case-and-a-global-climate-of-attacks-on-judicial-independence/
Mehmet Osman Kavala has been detained on spurious charges since October 2017. On 10 December 2019, in the Kavala v Turkey judgment, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found multiple violations of his rights arising from the unfounded arrest, detention and prosecution of the prominent human rights defender. Unusually, the Court required his immediate release. Mr Kavala and others were subsequently acquitted by a Turkish court, and briefly released. However on 19 February 2020, in a striking rebuke to the authority of the European Court and to the rule of law more broadly, Mr Kavala was rearrested hours after finally gaining his freedom.
Vague and broad-reaching laws governing support for terrorism, attacks on constitutional order and criminalising protest and dissent facilitate this type of judicial harassment and the suffocation of human rights defence in Turkey that his case represents. Our third party intervention before the European Court, on behalf of the Turkey Human Rights Litigation Support Project and PEN International, available here, outlines international law standards, including on the appropriate use of criminal law and free expression, and the duties to protect human rights defenders. A summary of the Court’s judgment is here.
On 3 December 2020, the latest resolution of the Committee of Ministers was handed down expressing “profound concern” with the on-going refusal of Turkish authorities to implement the judgment, and calling for Turkey to “assure the applicant’s immediate release.” The resolution is available here.
The Kavala case is emblematic of the crisis facing civil society and the rule of law in Turkey. The next hearing in his case in Turkey will be on 18 December 2020.
13 de octubre de 2020
Baltasar Garzón c. España
Alegaciones finales del Comunicante al Comité de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas
En julio de 2020, el gobierno de España presentó su respuesta en el fondo a la comunicación iniciada por Baltasar Garzón ante el Comité de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas, en enero de 2016. En un preocupante desafío a la autoridad del Comité, el gobierno insinuó estar respondiendo “por cortesía”, no por obligación legal. Esta semana, hemos presentado la contestación del Juez Garzón a las alegaciones del gobierno, y hemos solicitado al Comité que tome una decisión al respecto.
El caso atañe a múltiples procesamientos penales contra un juez sobre la única base de las interpretaciones que hizo de la ley. En el caso Franquismo, el Juez Garzón fue acusado de ordenar diligencias de investigación con respecto a los crímenes de lesa humanidad cometidos en España durante el régimen franquista, fundamentándose en la inaplicabilidad de la amnistía y la prescripción de tales crímenes a la luz de los estándares internacionales de derechos humanos y de la jurisprudencia española. En el caso Gürtel, fue acusado, condenado e inhabilitado de su cargo durante 11 años por autorizar interceptaciones limitadas de las conversaciones que mantenían acusados en prisión provisional con sus abogados, habida cuenta de los indicios de participación criminal de estos últimos y garantizando el derecho a la defensa de las personas investigadas. Tal y como nuestro escrito deja claro, ambos casos afectaban a áreas del derecho español controvertidas y sujetas a diversas interpretaciones por parte de los tribunales. En ambos casos, sus decisiones fueron razonables y razonadas. Todas estas resoluciones se impugnaron, fueron examinadas en apelación y se revocaron. Sus interpretaciones no fueron ni mucho menos únicas, sino que habían sido adoptadas también por otros jueces en varias ocasiones (sin haber sufrido éstos, en ningún caso, las consecuencias infligidas en el Juez Garzón).
Desde que la comunicación se presentó, en enero de 2016, el gobierno ha tratado en repetidas ocasiones de que se archivara el caso, introduciendo objeciones a la admisibilidad para evitar lidiar con el fondo de la cuestión. Sus alegaciones sobre admisibilidad continuaron incluso después de que el Comité decidiera, en octubre de 2019, que el asunto era admisible. En efecto, el Comité consideró que las peticiones del Juez Garzón estaban “suficientemente sustanciadas” y que resultaban admisibles. Éstas incluían: la arbitrariedad inherente a procesar a un juez por sus interpretaciones de la ley, y vulneraciones al derecho a un juicio justo (bajo el artículo 14(1) del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos); la denegación del derecho de apelación (artículo 14(5) del Pacto), y la violación del principio de legalidad por una interpretación expansiva e imprevisible de la figura penal de la “prevaricación”, ya ambigua de por sí (artículo 15 del Pacto).
Lamentablemente, la contestación del gobierno evita reconocer, o siquiera responder, al núcleo de las violaciones. Insiste en explicar por qué las decisiones adoptadas por Garzón fueron “erróneas”, desde su perspectiva. El gobierno aún trata de justificar el hecho de acusar a un juez por la vía penal, por haber considerado que la Ley de Amnistía es inaplicable para crímenes tan atroces, a pesar de que considerar lo contrario hubiera puesto a España en conflicto con sus obligaciones internacionales bajo el Pacto de Derechos Civiles y Políticos. Incluso después de que otras autoridades judiciales llegaran a la misma conclusión a la que llegó el Juez Garzón respecto a la norma que rige la interceptación de comunicaciones, y de que la ley española fuera modificada posteriormente en línea con esta interpretación, el gobierno también insiste en justificar su procesamiento por adoptar esta decisión. No se molesta en argumentar que la cuestión a dirimir aquí no es si la interpretación del juez era o no correcta, sino si está suficientemente justificado el hecho de acusar y condenar a un juez por la vía penal por la interpretación que llevó a cabo del derecho.
Pese a la evidente vulneración de sus derechos, el comunicante no ha obtenido ningún remedio o satisfacción, diez años después. Más allá de las implicaciones que ello tiene sobre sus derechos, el escrito hace hincapié en el impacto que estos hechos tienen sobre la independencia judicial. En un momento en que el procesamiento de jueces se ha utilizado como arma represiva en varios puntos de Europa, y fuera de ella, la decisión del Comité tendrá una notable repercusión. Se ha instado al Comité esta semana para que, finalmente, declare que la persecución de un juez por el ejercicio de sus funciones judiciales constituye un uso flagrantemente arbitrario del derecho penal y una clara violación del Pacto, así como para que reafirme lo esencial que resulta proteger la independencia judicial como un requisito fundamental de todo Estado de Derecho y como garantía de efectividad del sistema de protección de derechos humanos en su conjunto.
On 13 October 2020 HRiP filed final submissions on behalf of Baltasar Garzon in his long-running case against Spain before the UN Human Rights Committee.
In July 2020 the Spanish government submitted its response on the merits of the human rights complaint submitted by Garzón to the UN Human Rights Committee in January 2016. In a troubling rebuke to the Committee’s authority, the government purported to be answering as a matter of “courtesy,” not legal obligation. This week we presented Judge Garzon’s response to those governmental submissions and called on the Committee to bring the case to an end and to decide in favour of the applicant.
This remarkable and troubling case concerns multiple criminal prosecutions of a judge on the sole basis of his interpretations of the law. In the ‘Franquismo’ case, Judge Garzón was prosecuted for authorizing preliminary investigative steps into crimes against humanity perpetrated during Spain’s Franco regime, interpreting amnesty and prescription as inapplicable to such crimes in light of international human rights standards and Spanish jurisprudence. In the Gürtel case, he was prosecuted, convicted, and removed from office for 11 years for authorizing limited interceptions of prisoner-lawyer communications, provided there were indicators of criminality and measures taken to protect the rights of the defence. As our brief makes clear, both cases concerned areas where Spanish law was controversial, in flux, and subject to differing evaluations by different judges. In both cases, his decisions were reasoned and reasonable. All these decisions were challenged, appealed and overturned. His interpretations were far from unique, and similar judicial decisions had been taken by other judges (without the consequences inflicted on Judge Garzón). Despite this, he was subjected to criminal prosecution and punishment, with grave implications for his rights, and for judicial independence more broadly.
Since the case was filed in January 2016, the government has repeatedly sought to have this case dismissed, making multiple objections to admissibility to avoid having to deal with the substance of the claim. Such admissibility arguments continued even after the UNHRC decided, in October 2019, that the case was admissible. The Committee found Garzón’s claims ‘sufficiently substantiated’ on multiple grounds. These included: the inherent arbitrariness of prosecuting a judge for controversial legal interpretations, and violations of fair trial (under art. 14(1) ICCPR), the denial of the right of appeal (Article 14(5)), and the violation of the principle of legality through the expansive and unforeseeable interpretation of the vague crime of “prevaricacion” (criminal malfeasance) (Article 15).
Regrettably the Spanish response still fails to acknowledge, or respond to, the heart of the violations. It continues to argue why judge Garzón’s decisions were ‘erroneous’ in its view. The government still purports to justify prosecuting a judge for finding an amnesty law inapplicable to egregious crimes, despite the fact that doing otherwise would bring Spain in conflict with its international obligations under the ICCPR. Even after multiple other sources reached the same interpretation as Garzón of the law governing interceptions, and the Spanish law subsequently changed in line with his approach, the government also still purports to justify prosecuting him for that interpretation too. It does not engage with the fact that the question is not whether a judge’s interpretation and evaluation was correct, but whether it can justify criminally prosecuting them for their decisions.
Despite the notorious violation of his rights, the applicant has had no remedy or recognition for over ten years later. Beyond the rights implications of the case for him, the brief underscores the even more profound impact of these facts on judicial independence. At a time when the prosecution of judges has reared its head as a repressive tool of choice in several corners of Europe, and beyond, the Committee’s decision will have particular resonance. It has been asked this week to finally recognize that prosecuting a judge for the exercise of judicial functions is a flagrantly arbitrary use of criminal law in violation of the ICCPR, and to reassert the fundamental nature of judicial independence as a pre-requisite of the rule of law the effectiveness of the entire system for the protection of human rights.
On the 31st of July 2020, the Irish Supreme found the Irish Government’s ‘National Mitigation Plan’ on Climate Change inconsistent with Irish Climate legislation. The judgment makes an important contribution to a growing body of national climate justice jurisprudence and to greater accountability in the field.
In Friends of the Environment CLG v. The Government of Ireland & The Attorney General, the Supreme Court first rejected government arguments that the case was not justiciable as carbon reductions plans were matters of policy. It then went on to find in favour of the applicants on the merits. The government’s Plan, which “envisages an increase, rather than a decrease, in emissions over the initial period of the Plan while, at the same time, committing to achieving the objective of zero net carbon emissions by 2050”, was found to lacked the necessary specificity to allow a reasonable and interested observer to know in sufficient detail how the government planned to meet those goals. As a result “the Plan should be quashed on the grounds of having failed to comply with its statutory mandate” (§.6.48).
While the decision is based on Irish legislation, and not readily transferable, the principles enshrined in the judgment requiring transparency, clarity and specificity as to concrete steps governments are taking to meet their carbon reduction goals, will resonate beyond Ireland. A number of important human rights arguments (under the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights) were advanced in the case, though ultimately not fully addressed in this case. In part this was as a result of findings concerning lack of standing under Irish law for the NGO applicants to bring certain types of human rights claims. It was also unnecessary to determine the substantive of human rights issues in this case given the Court’s findings on the inadequacy of the climate mitigation Plan and the lack of access to information, as noted above. The human rights arguments developed here may well be crucial in other contexts and cases. As Justice Clark concluded: “I would reserve the position of whether, and if in what form, constitutional rights and state obligations may be relevant in environmental litigation to a case in which those issues would prove crucial” (§.9.5).
HRiP was honoured to support this ground breaking case as part of its climate justice portfolio.
Tenemos mucho para aprender de las luchas muy diversas por la justicia y los derechos humanos en Argentina, Kenia y Turquía, y sus limitaciones. El informe sobre el impacto del litigio estratégica contra tortura en detención en estos contextos, escrito para el Open Society Justice Initiative, está ahora disponible en Español.